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Abstract
This paper considers a time-inconsistent stopping problem in which the inconsistency
arises from non-constant time preference rates. We show that the smooth pasting principle,
the main approach that has been used to construct explicit solutions for conventional time-
consistent optimal stopping problems, may fail under time-inconsistency. Specifically, we
prove that the smooth pasting principle solves a time-inconsistent problem within the intra-
personal game theoretic framework if and only if certain inequalities are satisfied. By
a stopping model which is commonly used in real options approach, we show that the
violation of these inequalities can happen even for very simple non-exponential discount
functions. Moreover, we demonstrate that the stopping problem does not admit any intra-
personal equilibrium whenever the smooth pasting principle fails. The “negative” results in
this paper caution blindly extending the classical approaches for time-consistent stopping
problems to their time-inconsistent counterparts.
Key words: time inconsistency, equilibrium stopping rule, intra-personal game, smooth pasting,
nonexistence.
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1 Introduction
A crucial assumption on the conventional optimal stopping models is that a decision maker has
a constant time preference rate and hence discounts his/her future payoff exponentially. When
this assumption is violated, the optimal stopping problem becomes time-inconsistent in that any
optimal stopping rule obtained today may not be optimal in the future.1 As is standard in the
literature on decision making, time-inconsistent problems are often considered within the self-
control and intra-personal game theoretic framework and the corresponding equilibria are taken
as solutions to such problems.2
This paper studies a time-inconsistent stopping problem in continuous time. There are two
key contributions in this paper. First, we demonstrate that the smooth pasting (SP) principle,
which is commonly used to solve classical stopping problems may fail when time-consistency
is lost. Second, for a stopping model whose time consistent counterpart is widely used in real
options approach, we formally establish a condition under which no equilibrium stopping rule
exists. These results are constructive and they caution blindly extending the SP principle to time-
inconsistent stopping problems. These results also provide insights to solving time-inconsistent
stopping problems commonly found in finance and insurance.
Let us now elaborate the first contribution. Recall that the SP principle is a main approach
in deriving explicit solutions for conventional optimal stopping problems. When the objective
functional and underlying process satisfy some standard conditions, the SP principle yields a
solution to the optimal stopping problem. Recently, Grenadier and Wang (2007) and Hsiaw
(2013), among others, extend the SP principle to solving time-inconsistent stopping problems.
While the SP happened to work in the specific settings of these works, this paper, for the first time,
cautions the use of SP in solving time-inconsistent stopping problems. Unlike the conventional
stopping problems, the SP principle may fail under time-inconsistency, even for very simple and
common stopping problems. In other words, we cannot blindly apply the principle of SP to any
1In economics, Strotz (1955) first observed that non-constant time preference rates result in time-inconsistent
decisions.
2See, for example, Phelps and Pollak (1968); Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001); Krussell and Jr.
(2003) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003).
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stopping model when time-inconsistency is present.
The second contribution is about the nonexistence of the intra-personal equilibrium. For
a time-consistent stopping problem, optimal stopping rules exist when the objective functional
and the underlying process satisfy some mild regularity conditions (see, e.g., Peskir and Shiryaev
2006). However, this is no longer the case for the time-inconsistent counterpart. To illustrate this,
we study a stopping model which is different from a standard real options model in the discount
functions. For such time-inconsistent stopping problem, we prove that no equilibrium stopping
rule exists whenever the aforementioned inequalities are violated and hence the SP principle
fails. Consequently, our result shows that the desirable stopping rules within the intra-personal
game theoretic framework may not exist no matter what regularity conditions are imposed on
the underlying models.
Section 2 provides the foundation of this paper, It introduces the model of time prefer-
ences, formulates the time-inconsistent stopping problem within the intra-personal game theo-
retic framework and derives the Bellman system which characterizes the equilibrium stopping
rule. In the literature on time-inconsistent dynamic decision making (e.g., Grenadier and Wang
2007, Harris and Laibson 2013), the objective functional is often decomposed in terms of the pref-
erences of the future selves of an agent and thus the Bellman system is obtained by introducing
the so-called “continuation value functions,” which characterize the agent’s future selves’ pref-
erences. This method is widely used in the (randomized) quasi-hyperbolic discounting setting,
where the time preference only changes once from the perspective of the current self. However,
while the time preference (e.g., hyperbolic discounting) of the agent changes continuously, we
have to introduce a continuum of continuation value functions and thus restricting ourselves into
a point-wise analysis of the Bellman system. Therefore, it seems that the “continuation method”
conflicts with the essence of the concept of dynamics (or the Bellman system), which gives rise to
the main difficulty in handling general discount function within the intra-personal game theoretic
framework.
To overcome this difficulty, we derive the Bellman system in a different way. Our derivation is
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based on an observation of Ebert et al. (2016) that most of commonly used discount functions are
Laplace transforms of probability distributions and thus we can write them into weighted forms.
With this observation in mind, we do not need to decompose the objective functional in terms
of the future selves but rather a set of exponential discount functions. In this way, the objective
functional becomes the weighted average of a set of expectations of discounted payoff, in which
the discount function is exponential. Since each component of the objective functional shows a
constant discount rate, we do not need to introduce the “continuation functions.” Therefore, by
summing up the differential equations satisfied by each component of the objective functional,
we can obtain the Bellman system for which the equilibrium value function follows. Note that
the dynamics derived in this way is not switched among different future selves, thus simplifying
the problem and making the explicit solutions for a general discounting case possible.
To show that it is the time inconsistency that leads to the failure of the SP principle in
searching the explicit solutions, we need a time consistent benchmark in which the explicit
solution to the conventional Bellman system can be obtained. Section 3 devotes to this issue. To
ensure that the general solutions of the differential equation have the explicit form, we assume
the underlying process follows the geometric Brownian motion. Then for an objective functional
with general running cost, we prove that the SP principle is always successful in finding the
explicit solution to the time-consistent stopping problem.
In a setting similar to Section 3, Section 4 presents a time-inconsistent stopping problem
where the time inconsistency arises from the weighted discount functions. In many conventional
stopping problems, one may not need to worry about the failure of the SP principle in finding
the explicit solution to the Bellman system. This is because the SP principle cannot yield any
candidate solution when it cannot yield the explicit solution3. In contrast to the literature on
time-consistent stopping, we prove that while the SP principle always yields a candidate solution
to the Bellman system for the time-inconsistent stopping problem, the latter actually solves our
stopping problem if and only if certain inequalities are satisfied.
3For example, for a general underlying process, the explicit forms of the general solutions to the differential
equation in the Bellman system often cannot be obtained, a fortiori the explicit solution to the Bellman system.
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The value of the inequalities relies on whether the violation will happen for the commonly
used stopping models, in which the behavioral discounting theory can be applied. In Section
5, we present a stopping model with general behavioral discount functions. The time-consistent
counterpart of this model is widely used in the real options approach, which has been extended
into the behavioral setting by Grenadier and Wang (2007). By studying such time-inconsistent
stopping problem, we demonstrate that the violation of the inequalities is not uncommon. In fact,
we show that for some behavioral discount functions, including the pseudo-exponential discount
function (Ekeland and Lazrak 2006; Karp 2007; Harris and Laibson 2013), the inequalities may
not hold for plausible sets of parameter values of the chosen discount functions. Finally, we
derive a nonexistent result in the sense that the time-inconsistent stopping problem does not
admit any intra-personal equilibrium whenever the aforementioned inequalities are violated.
2 The Model
2.1 Time preferences
Throughout this paper we consider weighted discount functions defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Ebert et al. 2016) Let h : [0,∞)→ (0, 1] be strictly decreasing with h(0) = 1. h
is a weighted discount function if there exists a distribution function F (r) concentrated on [0,∞)
such that
h(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdF (r). (1)
Here F is known as the weighting distribution of h.
Many commonly used discount functions can be represented in weighted form. For example,
exponential function h(t) = e−rt, r > 0 (Samuelson 1937) and pseudo-exponential function h(t) =
δe−rt + (1 − δ)e−(r+λ)t, 0 < δ < 1, r > 0, λ > 0 (Ekeland and Lazrak 2006; Karp 2007), can be
obtained via degenerate and binary distributions respectively. For a more complicated example,
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the generalized hyperbolic discount function (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) with parameters
γ > 0, β > 0 can be written as
h(t) =
1
(1 + γt)
β
γ
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtf
(
r;
β
γ
, γ
)
dr (2)
where f(r; k, θ) = r
k−1e
−
r
θ
θkΓ(k)
denotes the density function of the Gamma distribution with parameters
k and θ and Γ(k) =
∫∞
0 x
k−1e−xdx represents the Gamma function evaluated at k. See Ebert et al.
(2016) for more examples and discussions about the types of discount functions that are of
weighted form.
The following well-known Bernstein’s theorem provides a characterization of weighted dis-
count functions in terms of the signs of all order derivatives.
Theorem 1 (Bernstein 1928) A discount function h is a weighted discount function if and
only if it is continuous on [0,∞), infinitely differentiable on (0,∞), and satisfies (−1)nh(n)(t) ≥ 0,
for all non-negative integers n and for all t > 0.
Bernstein’s theorem can be used to examine if a given function is a weighted discount function.
For example, the constant sensitivity discount function h(t) = e−at
k
, a, k > 0, and the constant
absolute decreasing impatience discount function h(t) = ee
−ct−1, c > 0, are both weighted discount
functions.
2.2 Stopping rules and equilibrium
Consider the complete filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0, P ) on which F is the P -
augmentation of the natural filtration generated by a diffusion process X, which is governed by
the following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)Wt, (3)
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where b, σ are Lipschitz continuous functions, i.e., there exists an L > 0 such that for any x 6= y
|b(x)− b(y)|+ |σ(x)− σ(y)| ≤ L|x− y|. (4)
We denote stopping rules and the corresponding stopping times as follows.
Definition 2 (Stopping rule) A stopping rule is a measurable function of time and the process
value u : ([0,∞)×R+,B[0,∞)×B(R+))→ {0, 1} where 0 indicates “continue” and 1 indicates “stop”.
For any given process X = {Xt}t≥0, a stopping rule u defines a flow of stopping times τ tu, t ∈ [0,∞)
via
τ tu = inf{s ≥ t, u(s,Xs) = 1}. (5)
At a calendar time t, an agent considers the following objective functional
J(t, x;u) = E
[∫ τ tu
t
h(s− t)f(Xs)ds+ h(τ tu − t)g(Xτ tu)|Xt = x
]
(6)
where u is the stopping rule applied at t, h is a weighted discount function with corresponding
weighting distribution F , g is continuous and bounded and f is a continuous function with
polynomial growth, i.e., there exists m ≥ 1, C > 0 such that
|f(x)| ≤ C(|x|m + 1). (7)
Moreover, for any r ∈ supp(F ), we suppose that there exists n ≥ 1, C(r) > 0 such that
sup
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rs|f(Xs)|ds + e−rτ |g(Xτ )||X0 = x
]
≤ C(r)(|x|n + 1) (8)
where T is the set of all stopping times with respect to the natural filtration and ∫∞0 C(r)dF (r)+∫∞
0 rC(r)dF (r) <∞.
In (6), the integrand depends explicitly on the current time t due to the non-separability of
a non-exponential h in the sense that h(s− t) 6= h(s)h(t)−1. As a result, any agent looking for an
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optimal strategy at each time encounters a time-inconsistent problem: the optimal stopping rule
itself changes over time. In this paper we consider a sophisticated and non-committed agent in
that the agent is aware of the time-inconsistency but unable to control his future actions. In this
case, he seeks to find a so-called equilibrium strategy within the intra-personal game theoretic
framework, in which the individual is represented by different players at different dates. A current
self formulates an optimal stopping rule taking as constraints the stopping rules chosen by future
selves.
Given the infinite horizon of the objective functional (6) and the stationarity of the underlying
process X, as is standard in literature (e.g. Grenadier and Wang 2007; Ekeland et al. 2012;
Harris and Laibson 2013.), we need to consider only stationary stopping rules so that the stopping
rule u is a function of the state variable x only. For this reason, the objective functional can be
written (with the time variable t suppressed) as:
J(x;u) = E
[∫ τu
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds + h(τu)g(τu)|X0 = x
]
, (9)
where τu = inf{s ≥ 0, u(Xs) = 1}.
An equilibrium stopping rule uˆ can now be regarded as a solution to a game in which each
self of the agent at time t is a player such that no self is willing to deviate from uˆ.4
Definition 3 (Equilibrium stopping rule) The stopping rule uˆ is an equilibrium stopping
rule if
lim sup
ǫ→0
J(x; uˆ)− J(x; uˆǫ,a)
ǫ
≤ 0 (10)
for x > 0, a ∈ {0, 1}, ǫ > 0, where
uˆǫ,a(s, x) =


uˆ(x) if s ∈ [ǫ,∞),
a if s ∈ [0, ǫ).
(11)
4Our equilibrium definition is consistent with those from time-inconsistent control problems (see
Bjork and Murgoci 2010; Ekeland et al. 2012 and Bjo¨rk et al. 2014.) when interpreting a stopping rule as a
binary control.
7
2.3 Equilibrium characterization
In conventional literature on time-inconsistent decision making, the objective functional is de-
composed in terms of future selves. The so-called “continuation” functions, which describe the
future selves’ preferences, are introduced.
Here let us first show how the weighted form discount functions enable us to eliminate the
continuum of “continuation” functions.
By defining the value function as V, i.e., V (x) := J(x; uˆ), where uˆ is the equilibrium stopping
rule as defined in Definition 3, then it follows from h(t) =
∫∞
0 e
−rtdF (r) that
V (x) = E
[∫ τuˆ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds+ h(τuˆ)g(Xτuˆ)|X0 = x
]
= E
[∫ τuˆ
0
∫ ∞
0
e−rsdF (r)f(Xs)ds +
∫ ∞
0
e−rτuˆdF (r)g(Xτuˆ)|X0 = x
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E
[∫ τuˆ
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt+ e−rτuˆg(Xτuˆ)|X0 = x
]
dF (r).
Let us denote E
[∫ τuˆ
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt+ e−rτuˆg(Xτuˆ)|X0 = x
]
by w(x; r). Then it is easy to see that the
differential equation that w satisfies in the continuation region is given by
1
2
σ2(x)wxx + b(x)wx + f(x)− rw(x; r) = 0.
Since V =
∫∞
0 w(x; r)dF (r), then the differential equation of V in the continuation region satisfies
the following equation:
1
2
σ2(x)Vxx + b(x)Vx + f(x)−
∫ ∞
0
rw(x; r)dF (r) = 0.
Note that by the decomposition above, we do not need to introduce the “continuation” functions,
therefore the dynamics of V characterized in this way will not change when the time preference
is switched from the current self’s to the future one.
Theorem 2 formally establishes the Bellman system to the time-inconsistent stopping problem
and provides the verification.
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Theorem 2 (Equilibrium characterization) Consider the objective functional (24) with weighted
discount function h(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdF (r), a stopping rule uˆ, underlying process X defined by (3),
functions w(x; r) = E
[∫ τuˆ
0
e−rtf(Xt)dt+ e−rτuˆg(Xτuˆ)|X0 = x
]
and V (x) =
∫ ∞
0
w(x; r)dF (r). Suppose
that w is continuous in x and V is continuously differentiable with its first-order derivative being
absolutely continuous. If (V,w, uˆ) solves
min
{
1
2
σ2(x)Vxx + b(x)Vx + f(x)−
∫ ∞
0
rw(x; r)dF (r), g(x) − V
}
= 0, (12)
uˆ(x) =


1 if V = g(x),
0 otherwise,
(13)
then uˆ is an equilibrium stopping rule and the value function of the problem is given by V (x),
i.e., V (x) = J(x; uˆ).
The proof to the above proposition and all subsequent propositions and corollaries are collected
in Appendix A.
3 The time consistent benchmark
This section presents a time-consistent stopping problem which we use as a benchmark. To show
how to use the SP principle to construct explicit solutions, we assume that the underlying process
X follows the following geometric Brownian motion:
dXt = bXtdt+ σXtdWt. (14)
In this section we consider the following classical time-consistent optimal stopping problem,
inf
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds + e−rτg(Xτ )|X0 = x
]
, (15)
where T is the set of all stopping times with respect to F.
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Without any loss of generality, we let the lump-sum payoff g(x) ≡ K > 0.5 Moreover, we
suppose that the running cost f is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave. To rule
out the “trivial cases” for the time consistent benchmark6, we suppose that f(0) < rK, b < r, and
limx→∞ fx(x)x =∞.
For the sake of simplicity, we define L(x; r) = E[
∫∞
0 e
−rsf(Xs)ds|X0 = x]. After some algebra,
we have
L(x; r) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
f(yx)e−rsG(y, s)dyds, (16)
where G(y, s) = 1√
2π
1
σy
√
s
e−
(ln y−(b− 1
2
σ2)s)2
2σ2s .
To guarantee the well-posedness of L and Lx, we suppose f has linear growth and fx(0+) <∞.
We now characterize the optimal stopping rule as follows.
Proposition 1 There exists an xb ∈ (0,∞), such that τb = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ xb} solves optimal
stopping problem (15).
By defining V b as the optimal value function and by the standard argument in optimal stopping,
we know that V b is continuously differentiable.7 The SP principle is indeed based on the C1−
regularity of the value function V b. We now attempt to seek a solution to the Bellman system
by the SP principle. As is well known, the SP starts with an Ansatz that assumes the agent
stops whenever the value of the underlying process X is greater or equal to xb. In this case, xb
5By modifying the running cost, we are able to let the stopping problem boils down to the constant lump-sum
payoff case. In fact, by Ito’s formula, it is to see that
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds+ e
−rτg(Xτ )|X0 = x
]
=E
[∫
τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds+ e
−rτK ++e−rτ(g(Xτ −K))|X0 = x
]
=E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds+ e
−rτK ++
∫ τ
0
e−rs(
1
2
σ2x2gxx(Xs) + bxgx(Xs)− r(g(Xs)−K))ds|X0 = x
]
.
Then letting f˜(x) := f(x) + 12σ
2x2gxx(Xs) + bxgx(Xs)− r(g(Xs)−K), the objective functional becomes the one
in problem (15) with running cost f˜ .
6Here we rule out the cases where either always stopping or never stopping is optimal.
7See, for example, Chapter 4 of Touzi (2012).
10
is known as the triggering boundary between continuing and stopping. The following describes
the procedure for identifying the triggering boundary.
First, in the continuation region (0, xb), V b satisfies the following differential equation,
1
2
σ2x2V bxx + bxV
b
x + f(x)− rV b = 0,
with the boundary conditions,
|V b(0+)| <∞, V b(xb) = K,
Second, solving the differential equation problem leads to
V b(x) = (K − L(xb; r))( x
xb
)α(r) + L(x; r), x < xb
V b(x) = K,x ≥ xb
where L(x; r) is defined by (16) and α(r) is given by
α(r) =
−(b− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(b− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
. (17)
Third and finally, after some algebra, it follows from the SP principle V bx (xb) = 0 that the
triggering boundary xb is the solution to the following equation:
α(r)(K − L(x; r)) + Lx(x; r)x = 0. (18)
Proposition 2 Equation (18) admits a unique solution in (0,∞).
The uniqueness of the solution to equation (18)signifies the effectiveness of the SP principle. If
equation (18) admits multiple solutions, we would not know which one is the triggering boundary
11
and thus the SP principle would fail in searching the optimal solution.
4 The SP principle under weighted discounting
In the classical literature on (time-consistent) stopping, optimal solutions are often obtained
by the SP principle since the candidate solution from the SP principle must solve the Bellman
system (and hence the optimal stopping problem) whenever some mild conditions, such as the
smoothness and concavity of the payoff functions, are satisfied. See, for example, the time-
consistent benchmark considered in Section 3. In economics terms, the SP principle amounts
to the matching of the marginal payoff at the stopping threshold; hence some economists apply
the SP principle without even explicitly introducing the Bellman system. However, as we will
formally justify in this section, the SP principle in the presence of time-inconsistency may not
yield a solution to the Bellman system (and therefore not to the stopping problem within the
game theoretic framework), no matter how smooth and concave the payoff functions might be.
To proceed, we consider the following objective functional:
J(x;u) = E
[∫ τu
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds+ h(τu)K|X0 = x
]
, (19)
where h is a weighted discount function with weighting distribution F while f and K are, respec-
tively, the running cost and lump-sum payoff functions considered in Section 3.
Note that writing a behavioral discount function in the weighted form facilitates us in de-
composing the objective functional (6) into a set of objective functionals considered in Section 3.
To ensure the optimal stopping region of each component is one-sided, we impose the assump-
tion that b < r,∀r ∈ supp(F ). Moreover, to make sure that the solution obtained subsequently
is finite and the interchangeability of integration and differentiation is valid, we assume that
max
{∫∞
0
1
r−bdF (r),
∫∞
0
1
r
dF (r),
∫∞
0 rdF (r)
}
< ∞ in the rest of the paper. This assumption is sat-
isfied by many discount functions, including the generalized hyperbolic discount function (2)
whenever α < β (will be discussed in this section) and the pseudo-exponential discount function
12
(to be discussed in the next section).
We now use the SP principle to solve the Bellman system in Theorem 2 with the objective
functional (19). Given the structure of the objective functional and the analysis from Section 3,
it is reasonable to conjecture that the equilibrium stopping region is [x∗,∞) and hence it follows
from the argument in Section 3 that each component w in the Bellman equation is given by
w(x; r) = (K − L(x∗; r))( x
x∗
)α(r) + L(x; r), x < x∗,
w(x; r) = K,x ≥ x∗,
where L(x; r) is defined by (16) and α(r) is given by (17). The value function V and equilibrium
stopping rule uˆ are, respectively, given by
V (x) =
∫ ∞
0
w(x; r)dF (r) =
∫ ∞
0
((K − L(x∗; r))( x
x∗
)α(r) + L(x; r))dF (r), x < x∗,
V (x) = K,x ≥ x∗.
and
uˆ(x) =


1 if x ≥ x∗,
0 otherwise.
It follows from the regularity of the value function V and the SP principle Vx(x∗) = 0, we have
∫ ∞
0
1
x∗
α(r)(K − L(x∗; r))dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
Lx(x∗; r)dF (r) = 0.
This is equivalent to
∫ ∞
0
(α(r)(K − L(x∗; r)) + Lx(x∗; r)x∗)dF (r) = 0. (20)
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Proposition 3 Equation (20) admits a unique solution in (0,∞).
Proposition 3 illustrates that the SP principle is successful at constructing a candidate solution to
the Bellman system under time inconsistency. Given the similar structure of equations (18) and
(20), it seems that the SP principle still works in the time-inconsistent setting. We argue that
this is a dangerous assumption. In fact, we formally show that for time-inconsistent stopping
problem, the candidate solution obtained by the SP principle may not solve the Bellman equation
in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 With the above notations, we suppose that α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K −L(x∗; r)) is increasing
in r. Then the triplet (V,w, uˆ) solves the Bellman system in Theorem 2 if and only if
f(x∗) ≥
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r)K, (21)
and
∫ ∞
0
α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K − L(x∗; r))dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
x2∗Lxx(x∗; r)dF (r) ≤ 0. (22)
Corollary 1 Suppose that α(r)(α(r)−1)(K−L(x∗; r)) is increasing in r, then uˆ defined in Theorem
3 is an equilibrium stopping rule if and only if both inequalities (21) and (22) hold.
5 An example from real options
This section presents a time-inconsistent stopping problem, whose time-consistent counterpart
is widely used in real options approach. Generally speaking, there are two types of stochastic
models in real options approach – optimal stopping or instantaneous control (impulse control). In
the classical literature on real options or instantaneous control, the time-consistent counterpart
of the stopping problem considered in this section is often viewed as the dual stopping problem
of the instantaneous control model8 and is used to search an optimal capacity or investment
8See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Grenadier (2002) and Dumas (1991) for economic interpretation
to the duality relationship. See, for example, Karatzas and Shreve (1984) and Boetius and Kohlmann (1998) for
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strategy for the firm in a monopolistic market. In addition, the objective functional also can
be used to analyze when to abandon an ongoing project for a decision maker with a behavioral
preference.9
Let the dynamics of an underlying process X = {Xt}t≥0 be given by
dXt = σXtdWt. (23)
Suppose that the running cost is X and the lump-sum payoff is K > 0, then the objective
functional is given by
J(x;u) = E
[∫ τu
0
h(s)Xsds + h(τu)K|X0 = x
]
. (24)
5.1 An explicit solution
We now seek to find an equilibrium stopping rule for the time-inconsistent problem. It follows
from the analysis in Section 4 that
L(x; r) = E[
∫ ∞
0
e−rtXtdt|X0 = x] = x
r
.
Thus we have
w(x; r) =
(
K − x∗
r
)(
x
x∗
)α(r)
+
x
r
, 0 < x < x∗
w(x; r) = K,x ≥ x∗
V (x) =
∫ ∞
0
(
K − x∗
r
)(
x
x∗
)α(r)
dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
x
r
dF (r), 0 < x < x∗
V (x) = K,x ≥ x∗
the connection between optimal stopping and instantaneous control in terms of stochastic control.
9See Dixit (2013) for the time-consistent counterpart of this problem.
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where
α(r) =
1
2
σ2 +
√
1
4
σ4 + 2σ2r
σ2
. (25)
It follows from equation (20) that x∗ is the solution to the equation below:
∫ ∞
0
(
K − x∗
r
)
α(r)dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
x∗
r
dF (r) = 0.
This, in turn, implies that
x∗ =
∫ ∞
0
α(r)dF (r)∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
dF (r)
K, (26)
so that the equilibrium stopping rule is given by
uˆ(x) =


1 if x ≥ x∗,
0 otherwise.
Proposition 4 With the above notations, the triplet (V,w, uˆ) solves the Bellman system in The-
orem 2 if and only if
∫ ∞
0
α(r)dF (r) ≥
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r)
∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
dF (r). (27)
Inequality (27) is a condition on the model primitives we must verify before we can apply the SP
principle to construct explicit equilibrium solutions to the time-inconsistent stopping problem.
It is easy to see that (27) is satisfied when the distribution function F is degenerate.10 This
reconciles with the time-consistent setting. The next result shows that (27) also holds for some
non-exponential discount functions.
10In this “degenerate” case, x∗ defined by (26) coincides with the solution derived by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
and Grenadier (2002) (with slightly altered notation).
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Corollary 2 Suppose that the discount function h is a generalized hyperbolic discount function,
that is,
h(t) =
1
(1 + γt)
β
γ
≡
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
r
β
γ
−1
e
− r
γ
γ
β
γ Γ(β
γ
)
dr, γ > 0, β > 0.
If γ < β ≤ σ22 , then (27) holds and that the triggering boundary x∗ is given by
x∗ =
∫ ∞
0
α(r)
r
β
γ
−1
e
− r
γ
γ
β
γ Γ(β
γ
)
dr
∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
r
β
γ
−1
e
− r
γ
γ
β
γ Γ(β
γ
)
dr
K.
5.2 A nonexistence result
The preceding subsection shown that the SP principle does not yield a solution to the time-
inconsistent stopping problem whenever inequality (27) is not satisfied. It is therefore of signifi-
cant interest to investigate if the time-inconsistent stopping problem admits any other solutions
that cannot be characterized by the SP principle or the Bellman system. The answer to the
above question is addressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider the objective functional (24) with weighted discount function h(t) =∫ ∞
0
e−rtdF (r) and the underlying process X defined by (23). If (27) does not hold, then no
equilibrium stopping rule exists.
The above proposition is a stronger result. It says that for the problem to have any equilibrium
stopping role (not necessarily the one obtained by the SP principle), the condition (27) must
hold.
To conclude this section, we present the following corollary which asserts that even for the
pseudo-exponential discount functions – the simplest class of non-exponential weighted discount
functions, an equilibrium stopping policy may not exist. This corollary, therefore, provides
evidence that the violation of inequality (27) is not uncommon.
Corollary 3 Suppose the pseudo-exponential discount function h(t) = δe−rt + (1− δ)e−(r+λ)t, 0 <
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δ < 1, r > 0, λ > 0. Then for any fixed r, δ, when λ is sufficiently large, no equilibrium stopping
rule exists.
6 Conclusion
While the SP principle has been widely used to study time-inconsistent stopping problems, our
results indicate the risk of using this principle on such problems. We have shown that the SP
principle solves the time-inconsistent problem if and only if certain inequalities are satisfied.
By a simple model which often appears in real options, we have found that these inequalities
may be violated even for a simple and commonly used non-exponential discount function. When
the SP principle fails, we have shown the intra-personal equilibrium does not exist. The nonex-
istence result and the failure of the SP principle suggest that it is imperative that the techniques
for conventional optimal stopping problems be used more carefully when extended to solving
time-inconsistent stopping problems.
A Appendix: proofs
For convenience, in this appendix we define Su = {x ∈ (0,∞) : u(x) = 1}. For any limit point
x ∈ (0,∞) of Su, since the underlying process X is a non-degenerate diffusion, then it follows
from standard literature (e.g., Chapter 3 of Ito and McKean Jr 1965.) that P(τu = 0|X0 = x) = 1,
and hence J(x;u) = 0. This means at any point of S¯u (the closure of Su), the agent will stop
immediately. We also define Cu = (0,∞) ∩ S¯uc, where S¯uc is the complementary set of S¯u.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
For the stopping rule uˆǫ,a, if a = 1, then J(x;uǫ,a) = K. The Bellman equation (12) shows that
V (x) ≤ K. This yields (10).
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If a = 0, we have that
J(x; uˆǫ,0) = E
[∫ ǫ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ
uˆ
ǫ
(h(s)− h(s− ǫ))f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E[(h(τ ǫuˆ)− h(τ ǫuˆ − ǫ))g(Xτǫuˆ)|Xt = x] + E[V (Xǫ)|X0 = x]
= E
[∫ ǫ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ
uˆ
ǫ
∫ ∞
0
e−r(s−ǫ)(e−ǫr − 1)dF (r)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−r(τ
ǫ
uˆ
−ǫ)(e−ǫr − 1)dF (r)g(Xτǫ
uˆ
)|X0 = x
]
+ E[V (Xǫ)|X0 = x]
= E
[∫ ǫ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
(e−ǫr − 1)w(Xǫ; r)dF (r)|X0 = x
]
+ E[V (Xǫ)|X0 = x]. (28)
Define τn = inf{s ≥ 0 : σ(Xs)Vx(Xs) > n} ∧ ǫ, then it follows Ito’s formula that
E [V (Xτn)|X0 = x] = E
[∫ τn
0
(
1
2
σ2(Xs)Vxx(Xs) + b(Xs)Vx(Xs))ds|X0 = x
]
+ V (x).
By the Bellman equation (12), we have that
E [V (Xτn)|X0 = x] = E
[∫ τn
0
(
1
2
σ2(Xs)Vxx(Xs) + b(Xs)Vx(Xs))ds|X0 = x
]
+ V (x)
≥ E
[∫ τn
0
(−f(Xs) +
∫ ∞
0
rw(Xs; r)dF (r))ds|X0 = x
]
+ V (x).
Note that conditions (7) and (8) ensure that −f(x) + ∫∞0 rw(x; r)dF (r) has polynomial growth,
i.e., there exist C > 0,m ≥ 1 such that
| − f(x) +
∫ ∞
0
rw(x; r)dF (r)| ≤ C(|x|m + 1),
which leads to
sup
0≤t≤ǫ
| − f(Xs) +
∫ ∞
0
rw(Xs; r)dF (r)| ≤ C( sup
0≤t≤ǫ
|Xt|m + 1).
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Moreover, under condition (4), it follows standard argument11 that equation (3) admits a unique
strong solution X such that
E[ sup
0≤t≤ǫ
|Xt|m|X0 = x] ≤ Kǫ(|x|m + 1)
with Kǫ > 0.
Then letting n→∞, we then by dominated convergence theorem have that
E [V (Xǫ)|X0 = x] ≥ E
[∫ ǫ
0
(−f(Xs) +
∫ ∞
0
rw(Xs; r)dF (r))ds|X0 = x
]
+ V (x).
Consequently,
lim inf
ǫ→0
J(x; uˆǫ,0)− J(x; uˆ)
ǫ
≥ lim inf
ǫ→0
E
[∫ ǫ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
(e−ǫr − 1)w(Xǫ; r)dF (r)|X0 = x
]
+ lim inf
ǫ→0
1
ǫ
E
[∫ ǫ
0
∫ ∞
0
(rw(Xt; r)dF (r) − f(Xt))dt|X0 = x
]
.
Then the continuity of f and w and polynomial growth conditions (7) and (8) allow the use of
dominated convergence theorem, which yields
lim inf
ǫ→0
J(x; uˆǫ,0)− J(x; uˆ)
ǫ
≥ 0.
This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the value function V b, then it follows from the standard argument12 that V b is contin-
uously differentiable and its first-order derivative is absolutely continuous. Moreover, V b solves
11See, for example, Chapter 1 of Yong and Zhou (1999).
12See. for example, Chapter 6 of Krylov (2008).
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the following Bellman equation
min
{
1
2
σ2x2V bxx + bxV
b
x + f(x)− rV b, K − V b
}
= 0. (29)
Define the continuation region by Cb = {x > 0 : v(x) < K} and the stopping region Sb = {x > 0 :
V b = K}.
First, we show that Sb 6= (0,∞). If not, we have V ≡ K. Thus 1
2
σ2x2V bxx+ bxV
b
x + f(x)− rV b < 0
whenever x ∈ {x > 0 : f(x) − rK < 0}. Since f(0) < rK, then the continuity of f leads to
{x > 0 : f(x)− rK < 0} 6= φ. This contradicts Bellman equation (29).
Second, we show that Cb 6= (0,∞). If not, we have V b(x) = L(x; r), with L defined by (16).
Since f is increasing and bounded from below by 0, then we have that
V b(∞) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
lim
x→∞ f(yx)e
−rsG(y, s)dyds.
Note that f(x) =
∫ x
0 fx(s)ds+ f(0), then the concavity of f yields that f(x) ≥ fx(x)x+ f(0). Then
it follows from limx→∞ xfx(x) = ∞ that limx→∞ f(x) = ∞, which yields that V b(∞) = ∞. This
contradicts V b(x) ≤ K.
Finally, it suffices to prove V is increasing. Consider V (x1) and V (x2), where 0 < x2 < x1 <
∞ and define the optimal stopping rule for problem (15) with X0 = x1 by u. Note that the
underlying process Xx0t = x0e
(b− 1
2
σ2)t+σWt , where x0 marks the starting point of X, then we have
that Xx1t > X
x2
t ,∀t ≥ 0. Hence
V (x1) = inf
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds + e−rτK|X0 = x1
]
= E
[∫ τu
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds+ e−rτuK|X0 = x1
]
≥ E
[∫ τu
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds + e−rτuK|X0 = x2
]
≥ inf
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rsf(Xs)ds+ e−rτK|X0 = x2
]
,
where the first inequality follows from the increase of f . This completes the proof.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let Q(x) := α(r)(K − L(x; r)) + Lx(x; r)x. We now prove Q(x) is strictly decreasing. Considering
the first-order derivative of Q, we have that Qx(x) = (−α(r) + 1)Lx(x; r) + Lxx(x; r)x. Then the
monotonicity of Q follows from the strictly increase of L, the concavity of L and α(r) > 1.
To justify the conclusion, we now only need to show Q(0) > 0 and Q(∞) < 0. It is easy to see
that Q(0) = α(r)(K − L(0; r)) = α(r)(K − f(0)
r
) > 0 and Q(x) = α(r)(K − L(0; r) − ∫ x0 Lx(s; r)ds) +
Lx(x; r)x. Moreover, since L is concave, then we have
∫ x
0 Lx(s; r)ds ≥ xLx(x; r). Thus Q(x) ≤
α(r)(K−L(0; r))+ (−α(r)+1)xLx(x; r) and it follows from limx→∞ xLx(x; r) =∞ and α(r) > 1 that
Q(∞) = −∞. This completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Following the proof of Proposition 2, we have that Q(x) :=
∫∞
0 (α(r)(K −L(x; r)) +Lx(x; r)x)dF (r)
is strictly decreasing, with Q(0) > 0 and Q(∞) < 0. This completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
It is useful to first present the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 For any stopping rule u and discount rate r > 0, E(x;u, r) = E[
∫ τu
0 e
−rtf(Xt)dt +
e−rτuK|X0 = x] is a continuous function of x, x ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. We consider the right continuity of E(·;u, r) at x0 > 0. The left continuity can be
discussed in the same way.
1. If there exists a δ > 0 such that (x0, x0 + δ) ∈ Cu or Su, then the right continuity of E(·;u, r)
at x0 is obtained immediately.
2. Otherwise, we first suppose f(x0) ≥ rK and consider the open set Cu ∩ (x0,∞). In the one
dimensional case, we have that Cu ∩ (x0,∞) = ∪n≥1(an, bn), where an, bn ∈ S¯u,∀n ≥ 1. It is
then easy to see that x0 is an accumulation point of {an}n≥1 and hence x0 ∈ S¯u.
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Consider the function I(x) := E(·;u, r)−K on (an, bn). By the standard argument, it is easy
to see that I solves the following differential equation,
1
2
σ2x2
d2I
dx2
+ bx
dI
dx
− rI + f(x)− rK = 0, (30)
with the boundary conditions,
I(an) = I(bn) = 0.
Consider an auxiliary function H which solves the following differential equation
1
2
σ2x2
d2H
dx2
+ bx
dH
dx
− rH + f(x)− rK = 0,
with the boundary conditions,
H(x0) = H(b1) = 0.
Since f(x) > rK on (x0,∞), the comparison principle shows thatH(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ [x0, b1].Using
comparison principle again on any (an, bn)∩ (x0, b1),∀n ∈ N+, we have that 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ H(x).
Then H(x) → H(x0) = 0 yields that I(·) is right continuous at x0 and the right continuity
of E(·;u, r) follows immediately.
For the case f(x0) < rK, it is easy to see that the same argument as above also applies.
In fact, consider the auxiliary function H1 which satisfies the differential equation (30)
in (x0, f−1(rK)) with the boundary condition H1(x0) = H1(f−1(rK)) = 0. The comparison
principle yields that H(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ 0 on (an, bn) ∩ (x0, f−1(rK)),∀n ∈ N+. Then the right
continuity of I(·) and E(·;u, r) follows immediately.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 2 Suppose uˆ is an equilibrium stopping rule, then J(x; uˆ) ≤ K,∀x ∈ (0,∞).
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Proof. If there exists x0 ∈ (0,∞) such that J(x0; uˆ) > K, then we have
lim sup
ǫ→0
J(x0; uˆ)− J(x0; uˆǫ,1)
ǫ
=∞,
where uˆǫ,1 is given by (11).
This contradicts the definition of an equilibrium stopping rule and thus completes the proof.
Lemma 3 Suppose that uˆ is an equilibrium stopping rule, then {x > 0 : f(x) < ∫∞0 rdF (r)K} ⊂ Cuˆ.
Proof. Suppose that there exists x ∈ {x > 0 : f(x) < ∫∞0 rdF (r)K} ∩ S¯uˆ, then it follows from
Lemma 2 that E[J(Xt; uˆ)|X0 = x] ≤ K. Consider the stopping rule uˆǫ,0, then (28) and J(x; uˆ) = K
lead to
J(x; uˆǫ,0)− J(x; uˆ)
ǫ
≤ 1
ǫ
E
[∫ ǫ
0
h(s)f(Xs)ds|X0 = x
]
+ E
[∫ ∞
0
(
e−ǫr − 1
ǫ
)
w(Xǫ; r)dF (r)|X0 = x
]
.
As w(·, r) is continuous (Lemma 1) and w(x0; r) = K, we have that
lim inf
ǫ→0
J(x; uˆǫ,0)− J(x; uˆ)
ǫ
≤ f(x)−
∫ ∞
0
rKdF (r) < 0.
This contradicts Definition 3 and completes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3. We begin the proof with the sufficiency. To show the
sufficiency, it suffices to show that V (x) ≤ K,x ∈ (0, x∗) and f(x)−
∫∞
0 rdF (r)K ≥ 0, x ∈ (x∗,∞).
First we show V (x) ≤ K. By simple algebra, we have that
Vxx(x) =
∫ ∞
0
α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K − L(x; r))( x
x∗
)α(r)
1
x2
dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
Lxx(x; r)dF (r).
We now show Vxx ≤ 0, x ∈ (0, x∗). As L is concave, then it suffices to show
∫∞
0 α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K −
L(x; r))( x
x∗
)α(r)dF (r) ≤ 0. It is easy to see that ( x
x∗
)α(r) is decreasing in r, given that α(r) is
increasing in r and x < x∗. Then the rearrangement inequality (e.g., Chapter 10 of Hardy et al.
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1952; Lehmann et al. 1966) yields that13
∫ ∞
0
α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K − L(x; r))( x
x∗
)α(r)dF (r)
≤
∫ ∞
0
α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K − L(x; r))dF (r)
∫ ∞
0
(
x
x∗
)α(r)dF (r). (31)
Therefore it follows (22) that Vxx(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ (0, x∗).
Note that Vx(x∗) = 0, then for ∀x ∈ (0, x∗), we have that Vx(x) ≥ 0, as Vxx(x) ≤ 0. Hence
V (x) ≤ K follows from V (x∗) = K.
Second, the argument f(x) − ∫∞0 rdF (r)K,x ∈ (x∗,∞) follows from the increase of f and
inequality (21). This completes the sufficiency.
We now turn to the necessity part. Since inequality (21) is an immediate corollary of Lemma
3, it suffices to prove inequality (22). Suppose that inequality (22) does not hold. Then by simple
calculation, we have that
Vxx(x∗−) =
∫ ∞
0
α(r)(α(r)− 1)(K − L(x∗; r)) 1
x2∗
dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
Lxx(x∗; r)dF (r) > 0.
Therefore, Vx(x∗) = 0 yields that there exists 0 < x1 < x∗ such that Vx(x) < 0 on x ∈ (x1, x∗). Then
it follows V (x∗) = K that V (x) > K on x ∈ (x1, x∗), which contradicts to Lemma 2 and hence the
proof is complete.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
The sufficiency is an immediate result of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
We now turn to the necessary condition. First, Lemma 3 and the increase of f yields inequality
(21). Second, similar to the proof of Theorem 3, by considering the property of Vxx in a left
13Inequality (31) can be read as
cov(X,Y ) ≤ 0,
with X = α(R)(α(R)− 1)(K−L(x;R))( x
x∗
)α(R) and Y = ( x
x∗
)α(R), where R is random variable with distribution
function F . Becasue of the monotonicity of X,Y in R, we have that X and Y are anti-comonotone. Then
inequality (31) follows from the fact that the covirance of two anti-comonotone random variables is not positive.
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neighborhood of x∗, we have there exists x ∈ Cuˆ, such that V (x) > K if inequality (22) does not
hold. Then the necessity follows from Lemma 2.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
The sufficiency is an immediate result of Theorem 2. We now turn to the necessary condition.
From the proof of Theorem 3, we have that there exists x ∈ C, such that J(x; uˆ) > K if inequality
(27) does not hold. Then the necessity follows from Lemma 2.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
It suffices to examine the conditions in Theorem 3. By some algebra, it is to see that α(r)(α(r)−
1)(K − L(x∗; r)) = 2σ2 (Kr − x∗), which is an increasing function in r.
Moreover, substitute the explicit representation of x∗ (26) into (21) and (22), then we have
that both of (21) and (22) are equivalent to (27). This completes the proof.
A.9 Proof of Corollary 2
It suffices to verify inequality (27).
Note that α(r)− 1 = −1
2
+
√
1
4
σ4+2σ2r
σ2
is a concave function, then we have
α(r)− 1 ≤ (α(r)− 1)′|r=0r + α(0)− 1 = 2
σ2
r.
Moreover, it is easy to see that
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r) = β and α(r) ≥ 1.
Therefore,
∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
dF (r)
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r) ≤ β 2
σ2
≤ 1 ≤
∫ ∞
0
α(r)dF (r).
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This completes the proof.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 4 Suppose that uˆ is an equilibrium stopping rule, then Cuˆ 6= (0,∞).
Proof. If Cuˆ = (0,∞), then uˆ ≡ 0, which shows that J(x, uˆ) =
∫∞
0 L(x; r)dF (r) =
∫∞
0
x
r
dF (r). Hence
J(x; uˆ)→∞, as x→∞. This contradicts Lemma 2 and completes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that x∗ = sup{x : x ∈ Cuˆ}, where uˆ is
an equilibrium stopping rule. It follows Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that x∗ ∈ (0,∞). By considering
J(x; uˆ) on (0, x∗], the standard argument leads to
J(x; uˆ) =
∫ ∞
0
(
K − x∗
r
)(
x
x∗
)α(r)
dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
x
r
dF (r).
As J(x; uˆ) ≤ K, J(x∗; uˆ) = K, we have that Jx(x∗−; uˆ) ≥ 0, i.e.,
∫ ∞
0
(
K − x∗
r
)
α(r)
1
x∗
dF (r) +
∫ ∞
0
1
r
dF (r) ≥ 0,
which in turn gives
x∗ ≤ K
∫∞
0 α(r)dF (r)∫∞
0
α(r)−1
r
dF (r)
.
Combining condition (27), we have
x∗ < K
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r),
which contradicts Lemma 3 and this completes the proof.
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A.11 Proof of Corollary 3
Because of Proposition 5, it suffices to show that inequality (27) does not hold, i.e.,
∫ ∞
0
α(r)dF (r) <
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r)
∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
dF (r).
where α(r) is defined by (25) and F (s) =


0 s < r,
δ r ≤ s < r + λ,
1 otherwise.
By simple calculation, it is easy to see that
∫ ∞
0
α(r)dF (r) = δα(r) + (1− δ)α(r + λ),
∫ ∞
0
rdF (r)
∫ ∞
0
α(r)− 1
r
dF (r) > (1− δ)(r + λ)δ
(
α(r)− 1
r
)
.
Then the result follows from the fact that (1 − δ)(r + λ)δ(α(r)−1
r
) grows faster than δα(r) + (1 −
δ)α(r + λ) in λ.
References
Bernstein, S. (1928): “Sur les fonctions absolument monotones,” Acta Mathematica, 52, 1–66.
Bjork, T. and A. Murgoci (2010): “A general theory of Markovian time inconsistent stochas-
tic control problems,” Available at SSRN 1694759.
Bjo¨rk, T., A. Murgoci, and X. Zhou (2014): “Mean-variance Portfolio Optimization with
State Dependent Risk Aversion,” Mathematical Finance, 24, 1–24.
Boetius, F. and M. Kohlmann (1998): “Connections between optimal stopping and singular
stochastic control,” Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 77, 253–281.
28
Dixit, A. (2013): The art of smooth pasting, Routledge.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994): Investment under Uncertainty, vol. 15, Princeton University
Press.
Dumas, B. (1991): “Super contact and related optimality conditions,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 15, 675–685.
Ebert, S., W. Wei, and X. Zhou (2016): “Weighted discounting–On group
diversity, time-inconsistency, and consequences for investment,” Available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2840240.
Ekeland, I. and A. Lazrak (2006): “Being Serious About Non-Commitment: Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Time,” Working Paper.
Ekeland, I., O. Mbodji, and T. A. Pirvu (2012): “Time-consistent portfolio management,”
SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 3, 1–32.
Grenadier, S. and N. Wang (2007): “Investment under Uncertainty and Time Inconsistent
Preferences,” Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 2–39.
Grenadier, S. R. (2002): “Option exercise games: An application to the equilibrium invest-
ment strategies of firms,” The Review of Financial Studies, 15, 691–721.
Hardy, G. H., J. E. Littlewood, and G. Po´lya (1952): Inequalities, Cambridge university
press.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson (2013): “Instantaneous Gratification,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 128, 205–248.
Hsiaw, A. (2013): “Goal-setting and self-control,” Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 601–626.
Ito, K. and P. McKean Jr (1965): Diffusion processes and their sample paths, Springer.
29
Karatzas, I. and S. E. Shreve (1984): “Connections between optimal stopping and singular
stochastic control I. Monotone follower problems,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
22, 856–877.
Karp, L. (2007): “Non-constant discounting in continuous time,” Journal of Economic Theory,
132, 557–568.
Krussell, P. and A. S. Jr. (2003): “Consumption-Savings Decision with Quasi-Geometric
Discounting,” Econometrica, 71, 365–375.
Krylov, N. V. (2008): Controlled diffusion processes, vol. 14, Springer Science & Business
Media.
Laibson, D. (1997): “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 112, 443–378.
Lehmann, E. L. et al. (1966): “Some concepts of dependence,” The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, 37, 1137–1153.
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1992): “Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and
an interpretation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 573–597.
Luttmer, E. and T. Mariotti (2003): “Subjective Discounting in an Exchange Economy,”
Journal of Politic Economy, 11, 959–989.
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2001): “Choice and Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116, 112–160.
Peskir, G. and A. Shiryaev (2006): Optimal stopping and free-boundary problems, Springer.
Phelps, E. and R. Pollak (1968): “On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium
Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 35, 185–199.
Samuelson, P. (1937): “A Note on Measurement of Utility,” Review of Economic Studies, 4,
155–161.
30
Strotz, R. (1955): “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,” Review of
Economic Studies, 23, 165–180.
Touzi, N. (2012): Optimal stochastic control, stochastic target problems, and backward SDE,
vol. 29, Springer Science & Business Media.
Yong, J. and X. Y. Zhou (1999): Stochastic controls: Hamiltonian systems and HJB equa-
tions, vol. 43, Springer Science & Business Media.
31
